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Abstract
The paper is devoted to quantization of extensive games with the use of both the
Marinatto-Weber and the Eisert-Wilkens-Lewenstein concept of quantum game.
We revise the current conception of quantum ultimatum game and we show why
the proposal is unacceptable. To support our comment, we present the new idea
of the quantum ultimatum game. Our scheme also makes a point of departure for
a protocol to quantize extensive games.
1 Introduction
During the last twelve years of research into quantum games the theory has been already
extended beyond 2 × 2 games. Since majority of noncooperative conflict problems are
described by games in extensive form, it is interesting to place extensive games in the
quantum domain. Although there is still no commonly accepted idea of how to play
quantum extensive games, we have proved in [4] that it is possible to use the frame-
work [2] of strategic quantum game to get some insight into quantum extensive games.
Namely, we have shown that a Hilbert space H = C2⊗C2⊗C2, a unit vector |ψin〉 ∈ H ,
the collection of subsets {Uj}j=1,2,3 of SU(2), and appropriately defined functionals E1
and E2 express the normal representation of a two stage sequential game. Moreover, it
allows to get a result inaccessible in the game played classically. In this paper, the above-
mentioned quantum computing description will be used to the two proposed variants of
the ultimatum game [5]. It is a game in which two players take part. The first player
proposes one of two proposals how to divide a fixed amount of good. Then the second
player either accepts or rejects the proposal. In the first case, each player receives the
part of goods according to player 1’s proposal. In the second case, the players receive
nothing. A game-theoretic analysis shows that player 1 is in a better position. Since
player 2’s rational move is to accept each proposal, player 1’s rational move is to make
the best proposal for her. As we will show in this article, the Eisert-Wilkens-Lewenstein
(EWL) approach [1] as well as Marinatto-Weber (MW) approach [7] can change the
scenario of the ultimatum game significantly improving the strategic position of player
2. Our paper also provides an argument indicating that the previous idea [8] of quantum
ultimatum game is not sufficient to describe the game in the quantum domain. We will
explain that, in fact, the formerly proposed protocol does not quantize the ultimatum
game but another 2×2 game. The last part of the paper is devoted to a form of a game
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tree where we provide the procedure how to determine the game tree when the game is
played according to the MW approach.
2 Preliminaries to game theory
Definitions in the preliminaries are based on [11]. This section starts with a definition
of a finite extensive game.
Definition 2.1 Let the following components be given.
• A finite set N = {1, 2, . . . , n} of players.
• A set H of finite sequences that satisfies the following two properties:
1. the empty sequence ∅ is a member of H;
2. if (ak)k=1,2,...,K ∈ H and K > 1 then (ak)k=1,2,...,K−1 ∈ H.
Each member of H is a history and each component of a history is an action taken
by a player. A history (a1, a2, . . . , aK) ∈ H is terminal if there is no aK+1 such
that (a1, a2, . . . , aK , aK+1) ∈ H. The set of actions available after the nonterminal
history h is denoted A(h) = {a : (h, a) ∈ H} and the set of terminal histories is
denoted Z.
• The player function P : H \ Z → N ∪ {c} that points to a player who takes an
action after the history h. If P (h) = c then chance (the chance-mover) determines
the action taken after the history h.
• A function f that associates with each history h for which P (h) = c an independent
probability distribution f(·|h) on A(h).
• For each player i ∈ N a partition Ii of {h ∈ H\Z : P (h) = i} with the property that
for each Ii ∈ Ii and for each h, h′ ∈ Ii an equality A(h) = A(h′) is fulfilled. Every
information set Ii of the partition corresponds to the state of player’s knowledge.
When the player makes move after certain history h belonging to Ii, she knows
that the course of events of the game takes the form of one of histories being part
of this information set. She does not know, however, if it is the history h or the
other history from Ii.
• For each player i ∈ N a utility function ui : Z → R which assigns a number
(payoff) to each of the terminal histories.
A six-tuple (N,H, P, f, {Ii}, {ui}) is called a finite extensive game.
Our deliberations focus on games with perfect recall (although Def. 2.1 defines extensive
games with imperfect recall as well) - this means games in which at each stage every
player remembers all the information about a course of the game that she knew earlier
(see [9] and [11] to learn about formal description of this feature).
The notions: action and strategy mean the same in static games, because the players
choose their actions once and simultaneously. In the majority of extensive games a player
can make her decision about an action depending on all the actions taken previously by
herself and also by all the other players. In other words, players can make some plans of
actions at their disposal such that these plans point out to a specific action depending
on the course of a game. Such a plan is defined as a strategy in an extensive game.
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Definition 2.2 A pure strategy si of a player i in a game (N,H, P, fc, {Ii}, {ui}) is
a function that assigns an action in A(Ii) to each information set Ii ∈ I.
Like in the theory of strategic games, a mixed strategy ti of a player i in an extensive game
is a probability distribution over the set of player i’s pure strategies. Therefore, pure
strategies are of course special cases of mixed strategies and from this place whenever we
shall write strategy without specifying that it is either pure or mixed, this term will cover
both cases. Let us define an outcome O(s) of a strategy profile s = (s1, s2, . . . , sn) in an
extensive game without chance moves to be a terminal history that results when each
player i ∈ N follows the plan of si. More formally, O(s) is the history (a1, a2, . . . , aK) ∈ Z
such that for 0 ≤ k < K we have sP (a1,a2,...,ak)(a1, a2, . . . , ak) = ak+1. If s implies a history
that contains chance moves, the outcome O(s) is an appropriate probability distribution
over histories generated by s.
Definition 2.3 Let an extensive game Γ = (N,H, P, {Ii}, {ui}) be given. The normal
representation of Γ is a strategic game (N, {Si}, {u′i}) in which for each player i ∈ N :
• Si is the set of pure strategies of a player i in Γ;
• u′i :
∏
i∈N Si → R defined as u′i(s) := ui(O(s)) for every s ∈
∏
i∈N Si and i ∈ N .
One of the most important notions in game theory is a notion of an equilibrium intro-
duced by John Nash in [10]. A Nash equilibrium is a profile of strategies where the
strategy of each player is optimal if the choice of its opponents is fixed. In other words,
in the equilibrium none of the players has any reason to unilaterally deviate from an
equilibrium strategy. A precise formulation is as follows:
Definition 2.4 Let (N, Si, {ui}i∈N) be a strategic game. A strategy profile (t∗1, t∗2, . . . , t∗n)
is a Nash equilibrium (NE) if for each player i ∈ N and for all si ∈ Si:
ui(t
∗
i , t
∗
−i) ≥ ui(si, t∗−i) where t∗−i = (t∗1, . . . , t∗i−1, t∗i+1, . . . , t∗n). (1)
A Nash equilibrium in an extensive game with perfect recall is a Nash equilibrium of
its normal representation, hence Def. 2.4 applies to strategic games as well as extensive
ones.
3 The ultimatum game
The ultimatum game is a problem in which two players face a division of some amount AC
of money. The first player makes the second one a proposal of how to divide AC between
them. Then the second player has to decide either accept or reject that proposal. The
acceptance means each player receives a part of AC according to the first player’s proposal.
If the second player rejects, each player receives nothing. Let us consider the a variant
of the ultimatum game in which player 1 has two proposals to share AC: a fair division
uf = (AC/2,AC/2) and unfair one uu = (δAC, (1 − δ)AC), where the δ is a fixed factor such
that 1/2 < δ < 1. This problem is an extensive game with perfect information that
takes the form:
Γ1 = ({1, 2}, H, P, {Ii}, u) (2)
with components defined as follows:
• H = {∅, c0, c1, (c0, d0), (c0, d1), (c1, e0), (c1, e1)};
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• P (∅) = 1, P (c0) = P (c1) = 2;
• I1 = {∅}, I2 = {{(c0)}, {(c1)}};
• u(c0, d0) = (AC/2,AC/2), u(c1, e0) = (δAC, (1− δ)AC),
u(c0, d1) = u(c1, e1) = (0, 0).
The extensive and the normal representation of Γ1 is shown in Figure 1. Equilibrium
analysis of the normal representation gives us three pure Nash equilibria: (c0, d0e1),
Figure 1: A two proposal ultimatum game Γ1: an extensive form a) and a normal
form b).
(c1, d0e0) and (c1, d1e0). There are also mixed equilibria: a profile where player 1 chooses
c0 and player 2 chooses d0e0 with probability p ≤ 1/(2δ) and d0e1 with probability 1−p,
and a profile where player 1 decides to play c1 and player 2 chooses any probability
distribution over strategies d0e0 and d1e0. However, we can put these ones aside since
both mixed equilibria do not contribute to the utility outcomes of Γ1. They generate the
same utility outcomes as the pure ones: (AC/2,AC/2) and (δAC, (1−δ)AC), respectively. The
key feature that make the game Γ1 so curious is that only equilibrium profile (c1, d0e0)
with unfair outcomes (δAC, (1 − δ)AC) is a reasonable scenario among all the equilibria
of the ultimatum game (many experiments show that people are inclined to choose fair
division (AC/2,AC/2), however we stick to the natural assumption of game theory that
players are striving to maximize their payoffs). The strategy combination (c1, d0e0)
is the unique equilibrium that is subgame perfect (the idea of subgame perfection is
the well-known equilibrium refinement formulated by Selten [13]) i.e. it is a profile of
strategies that induces a Nash equilibrium in every subgame (there are three subgames
in Γ1: the entire game, a game after the action c0 and a game after the action c1). At
the same time the subgame perfection rejects equilibria that are not credible. Let us
consider the profile (c0, d0e1). Here, the strategy d0e1 of player 2 demands the action
e1 when player 1 chooses c1. However, when c1 occurs, a rational move of player 2
is e0. Similar analysis shows that also (c1, d1e0) is not subgame perfect equilibrium.
Although the notion of subgame perfection is related to the extensive form of a game,
we can easily determine subgame perfect equilibria in any two stage extensive game with
perfect information (or even in a wider class of extensive games) through an analysis
of its normal representation. In the game Γ1 an action taken by player 1 determines a
subgame in which only player 2 makes a move. Thus subgame perfect equilibrium in Γ1
is a Nash equilibrium with a property that a strategy of player 2 is the best response to
every strategy of player 1 (i.e., a strategy that weakly dominates the others).
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4 Criticism of the previous approach to
quantum ultimatum game
A misrepresentation of the classical ultimatum game is the source of its incorrect quan-
tum representation in [8]. The author describes the ultimatum problem as a 2×2 game
and then applies the MW and the EWL schemes to construct the quantum game. How-
ever, as we have seen in Figure 1b, 2 × 4 is a minimal dimension allowing to represent
the ultimatum game in normal form. A hypothetical case of the ultimatum game in
which player 2 has only two strategies after an action taken by player 1 implies that
player 2 is deprived of capability to make her move conditioned on the action of the
first player. That is tantamount to an event where the players take their actions at the
same time or one of the players chooses her action as the second but she does not have
any information about an action taken by her opponent. It does not correspond to a
description of the ultimatum game where the second player knows a proposal of her
opponent and depending on the move of the first player she makes her action. Although
the player 2 has only two actions: accept or reject in the two-proposal ultimatum game,
in fact she has four pure strategies defined as her plans of an action at each of her
information sets. Therefore, a 2× 2 strategic game cannot depict the ultimatum game.
Consequently, the MW and the EWL approach used for quantization of a 2 × 2 game
cannot produce a quantum version of this game. Neither of these quantum realizations
contains the classical ultimatum game.
5 The quantum ultimatum game obtained by quan-
tization of the normal representation of the clas-
sical game
First, let us remind the protocol for playing quantum games defined in [4]. It is a
six-tuple:
ΓQI = (H , N, |ψin〉, ξ, {Uj}, {Ei}) (3)
where the components are defined as follows:
• H is a complex Hilbert space⊗mj=1C2 with an orthonormal basis B.
• N is a set of players with the property that |N | ≤ m.
• |ψin〉 is the initial state of a system of m qubits |ϕ1〉, |ϕ2〉, . . . , |ϕm〉.
• ξ : {1, 2, . . . , m} → N is a surjective mapping. A value ξ(j) indicates a player who
carries out a unitary operation on a qubit |ϕj〉.
• For each j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , m} the set Uj is a subset of unitary operators from SU(2)
that are available for a qubit j. A (pure) strategy of a player i is a map τi that
assigns a unitary operation Uj ∈ Uj to a qubit |ϕj〉 for every j ∈ ξ−1(i). The final
state |ψfin〉 when the players have performed their strategies on corresponding
qubits is defined as:
|ψfin〉 := (τ1, τ2, . . . , τn)|ψin〉 =
⊗
i∈N
⊗
j∈ξ−1(i)
Uj |ψin〉. (4)
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• For each i ∈ N the map Ei is a utility (payoff) functional that specifies a utility
for the player i. The functional Ei is defined by the formula:
Ei =
∑
|b〉∈B
vi(b)|〈b|ψfin〉|2, where vi(b) ∈ R. (5)
The above scheme is adapted for extensive games with two available actions at each
information set so that we could use only qubits for convenience. Any game richer
in actions can be transferred to quantum domain by using quantum objects of higher
dimensionality.
The idea framed in [4] bases on identifying unitary actions taken on a qubit with
actions taken in an information set of classical game. Therefore, three qubits are required
to express the ultimatum game in quantum information language. Since the first player
has one information set and the second player has two ones, player 1 performs a unitary
operation on only one qubit and player 2 operates on the rest. Like in [8] we examine
the two approaches: the MW approach and the EWL approach to quantizing Γ1.
5.1 The MW approach
Let us consider the following six-tuple:
ΓMW1 = (Hc, {1, 2}, |ψin〉, ξ, {{σ0, σ1}i}, {Ei}) , (6)
where:
• Hc is a Hilbert space
⊗3
j=1C
2 with the computational basis states |x1, x2, x3〉,
xj = 0, 1;
• the initial state |ψin〉 is a general pure state of three qubits:
|ψin〉 =
∑
x∈{0,1}3
λx|x〉, where λx ∈ C and
∑
x∈{0,1}3
|λx|2 = 1; (7)
• the map ξ on {1, 2, 3} given by the formula: ξ(j) =
{
1, if j = 1;
2, if j ∈ {2, 3}.
• σ0 =
(
1 0
0 1
)
and σ1 =
(
0 1
1 0
)
;
• the payoffs functionals Ei, i = 1, 2, are of the form:
E1 =
1
2
AC
∑
x3
|〈00, x3|ψfin〉|2 + δAC
∑
x2
|〈1, x2, 0|ψfin〉|2;
E2 =
1
2
AC
∑
x3
|〈00, x3|ψfin〉|2 + (1− δ)AC
∑
x2
|〈1, x2, 0|ψfin〉|2.
(8)
By definition of ξ in Γ1, player 1 acts on the first qubit and treats the operators σ
1
0
and σ11 as her strategies. Player 2 acts on the second and the third qubit, hence her
pure strategies are σ20 ⊗ σ30 , σ20 ⊗ σ31 , σ21 ⊗ σ30 and σ21 ⊗ σ31 (the upper index denotes a
qubit on which an operation is made). Let us determine for each profile
(
σ1κ1,
(
σ2κ2 , σ
3
κ3
))
,
where κ1, κ2, κ3 ∈ {0, 1}, the corresponding expected utility Ei by using formulae (4)-(5)
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Figure 2: The MW approach to the normal representation of Γ1.
and the specification of (6). We illustrate it using as an example Ei (σ
1
0, (σ
2
1 , σ
3
0)) for
i = 1, 2. The initial state after the players choose the profile (σ10, (σ
2
1 , σ
3
0)) takes the form
|ψfin〉 = σ10 ⊗ σ21 ⊗ σ30|ψin〉. Thus, we have:
|ψfin〉 =
∑
x1,x2,x3∈{0,1}
λx1,x2,x3|x1, x2, x3〉, (9)
where x2 is the negation of x2. Putting the final state (9) into the first of Eq. (8) we
obtain:
E1
(
σ10 ,
(
σ21 , σ
3
0
))
=
1
2
AC
(|λ010|2 + |λ011|2)+ δAC (|λ100|2 + |λ110|2) . (10)
Obviously, we have (1 − δ)AC instead of δAC in the expected utility E2. Therefore, the
payoff vector (E1, E2) is uf (|λ010|2 + |λ011|2) + uu (|λ100|2 + |λ110|2) in that case. Payoff
vectors (E1, E2) for all possible profiles
(
σ1κ1 ,
(
σ2κ2 , σ
3
κ3
))
are placed in the matrix repre-
sentation in Figure 2 (for convenience we convert binary indices (x1, x2, x3)2 of λx1,x2,x3
to the decimal numeral system).
Let us examine the game in Figure 2 to answer to what degree passing to the quantum
domain may influence the result of the game. Notice first that (6) is indeed the quantum
game in the spirit of the MW approach - the normal representation of Γ1 can be obtained
from ΓMW1 by putting |λ0|2 = 1 and |λx|2 = 0 for x = 1, 2, . . . , 7, i.e., if we put |ψin〉 =
|000〉. More generally: ΓMW1 coincides to a game isomorphic to the normal representation
of Γ1 if we put as |ψin〉 = |x1, x2, x3〉 any basis state. Then ΓMW1 is equal to Γ1 up to the
order of players’ strategies. The game Γ1 favors player 1 as we have learnt in Section 3
Thus, an interesting problem is to look for another form of the initial state (7) that
imply fairer solution unavailable in the game Γ1. Let us study first:
|ψin1〉 = 1
2
(|000〉+ |001〉+ |100〉+ |110〉) . (11)
Through the substitution |λ0|2 = |λ1|2 = |λ4|2 = |λ6|2 = 1/4 (the other squares of the
moduli equal 0) to entries of the matrix representation in Figure 2 we obtain a game
where the only reasonable equilibrium profile is σ10⊗σ20⊗σ30 with corresponding expected
utility vector E = (E1, E2) equal (uf + uu) /2. The other pure equilibria: σ
1
1 ⊗ σ20 ⊗ σ31
and σ11 ⊗ σ21 ⊗ σ31 - both generating the utility outcome (uf + uu) /4 are obviously worse
for both players so they won’t be chosen. Moreover, σ10 ⊗ σ20 ⊗ σ30 is an imitation of
a subgame perfect equilibrium - the strategy of the second player σ20 ⊗ σ30 is the best
response to any strategy of the first player. To sum up, the initial state (11) is beneficial
to player 2 compared with the classical case. It turns out that the answer to the question:
is there any |ψin〉 allowing to obtain a fair division of AC, is also positive. Let us consider
any state of the form:
|ψin2〉 =
√
1
2δ′
|000〉+
√
1− 1
2δ′
|001〉, where 1
2
< δ < δ′ < 1. (12)
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Once again the profile σ10 ⊗ σ20 ⊗ σ30 constitutes a Nash equilibrium and the strategy of
the second player σ20 ⊗ σ30 weakly dominates her other strategies as a result of putting
|λ0|2 = 1/2δ′ and |λ1|2 = 1 − 1/2δ′ in the game in Figure 2. Since there are no other
profiles with that property, σ10 ⊗ σ20 ⊗ σ30 is the most reasonable scenario that implies
E1,2(σ
1
0 ⊗ σ20 ⊗ σ30) = AC/2. The superposition of the third qubit (the second qubit of
player 2) is essential to obtain fair division result since it is impossible to achieve δAC by
player 1 then. Therefore, the payoff AC/2 becomes the most attractive for her now.
The conclusions we can draw from the analysis of the MW approach to the ultimatum
game are as follows. First, the game ΓMW1 that begins with |ψin1〉 discloses a game tree
different from the one in Figure 1a). If there is a protocol for quantizing the extensive
game Γ1 directly without using its normal representation as in our case, then the output
game tree must be different from the game tree of Γ1 in general. It follows form the fact
that the game tree in Figure 1a with any four utility outcomes assigned to its terminal
histories implies the normal representation specified by only these four payoff outcomes.
However, the game ΓMW1 where the initial state take the form of (11) has five different
outcomes. Notice, that is not irrelevant issue bearing in mind the fact that the bimatrix
of a strategic game played classically as well as played by the MW protocol always have
the same dimension.
The case where game begins with the state (12) is applied shows that even a separable
initial state can influence significantly a result of Γ1. It is not strange property. Any
superposition of a player’s qubit causes some limitation on players’ influence on their
qubits as we have seen in the case (11). In particular, if each qubit of the initial
state is in the state |+〉 = (|0〉+ |1〉) /√2, no player can affect amplitudes of her qubit
applying only σ0 and σ1 (measurement outcomes 0 and 1 on qubit occur with the same
probability). Then the result of the game only depends on the initial state |ψin〉 =
|+〉|+〉|+〉.
5.2 The EWL approach
As we have seen, the two-element set of unitary operators is too simple in some cases.
The two-parameter unitary operations used in the EWL protocol allow to avoid player’s
powerlessness when she acts on |+〉, and generally each player can essentially affect
amplitudes of the initial state. Thus, it is interesting to find a result of the ultimatum
game played according to the EWL approach. Let the following six-tuple be given:
ΓEWL1 = (He, {1, 2}, |ψ000〉, ξ, {{U(θ, β)}i}, {Ei}) , (13)
where:
• He is a Hilbert space
⊗3
j=1C
2 with the basis {|ψx1,x2,x3〉 : xj = 0, 1} of entangled
states defined as follows:
|ψx1,x2,x3〉 =
|x1, x2, x3〉+ i|x1, x2, x3〉√
2
; (14)
• the mapping ξ is the same as in six-tuple (6);
• the player’s actions {U(θ, β) : θ ∈ [0, pi], β ∈ [0, pi/2]}, studied, for example, in the
paper [3], form an alternative to two-parameter unitary operations used in [1].
They are of the form:
U(θ, β) =
(
cos(θ/2) ieiβ sin(θ/2)
ie−iβ sin(θ/2) cos(θ/2)
)
; (15)
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• Ei for i = 1, 2 are the payoff functionals (8) defined for the basis (14):
E1 =
1
2
AC
∑
x3
|〈ψ00,x3 |ψfin〉|2 + δAC
∑
x2
|〈ψ1,x2,0|ψfin〉|2;
E2 =
1
2
AC
∑
x3
|〈ψ00,x3 |ψfin〉|2 + (1− δ)AC
∑
x2
|〈ψ1,x2,0|ψfin〉|2.
(16)
Each strategy U1 of player 1 is simply U(θ1, β1). The strategies of the second player are
chosen in a manner similar to ΓMW1 - they are tensor products U2 ⊗ U3 = U(θ2, β2) ⊗
U(θ3, β3). The final state |ψfin〉 corresponding to a profile τ = ((θ1, β1), (θ2, β2, θ3, β3)) is
as follows:
|ψfin〉 = U1 ⊗ U2 ⊗ U3|ψ000〉 = 1√
2
∑
x∈{0,1}3
υx|x〉, (17)
where
υx1,x2,x3 = i
∑
xje−i
∑
xjβj
∏
j
cos
(
xjpi − θj
2
)
+ (−i)
∑
xjei
∑
xjβj
∏
j
cos
(
xjpi − θj
2
)
, (18)
and j = 1, 2, 3, xj = 0, 1, and xj is negation of xj . Putting (16) and (17) into formula
(5) we obtain the following expected payoff vector (E1(τ), E2(τ)):
(E1(τ), E2(τ)) =
uf
[
cos2
θ1
2
cos2
θ2
2
(
cos2
θ3
2
+ sin2
θ3
2
cos2 β3
)
+ sin2
θ1
2
sin2
θ2
2
(
sin2
θ3
2
sin2(β1 + β2 + β3) + cos
2 θ3
2
sin2(β1 + β2)
)]
+ uu
[
sin2
θ1
2
cos2
θ3
2
(
cos2
θ2
2
cos2 β1 + sin
2 θ2
2
cos2(β1 + β2)
)
+ cos2
θ1
2
sin2
θ3
2
(
sin2
θ2
2
sin2(β2 + β3) + cos
2 θ2
2
sin2 β3
)]
. (19)
Let us check first that ΓEWL1 generalizes the classical ultimatum game Γ1. Pure strategies
of the first player are represented by U(0, 0) and U(pi, 0). Similarly, the set of strategies
of the second player in Γ1 is represented by a set {U(θ2, 0) ⊗ U(θ3, 0) : θ2, θ3 ∈ {0, pi}}
since the set of profiles
{((θ1, 0), (θ2, 0, θ3, 0)) : θ1, θ2, θ3 ∈ {0, pi}} (20)
in (13) and the set of profiles
{(ck1, dk2ek3) : k1, k2, k3 ∈ {0, 1}} (21)
in (2) generate the same payoffs. Equivalents of behavioral strategies of Γ1 (i.e., inde-
pendent probability distributions p, q and r over the actions ck1, dk2 and ek3, respec-
tively, specified by players at their own information sets) can be found among unitary
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strategies as well. If we restrict unitary actions to U(θ, 0), i.e., to profiles of the form
((θ1, 0), (θ2, 0, θ3, 0)), θj ∈ [0, pi], the right-hand side of Eq. (19) takes the form:
uf cos
2 θ1
2
cos2
θ2
2
+ uu sin
2 θ1
2
cos2
θ3
2
. (22)
By substituting p for cos2(θ1/2), q for cos
2(θ2/2), and r for cos
2(θ3/2) we get the expected
payoffs corresponding to any behavioral strategy profile ((p, 1−p), ((q, 1−q), (r, 1−r)))
in Γ1.
Let us examine an impact of the unitary strategies on a result of the EWL ap-
proach to Γ1. In particular we ask the question if the unfair division uu or the fair
division uf in Γ
EWL
1 is more probable. Notice, that the profile ((θ1, β1), (θ2, β2, θ3, β3)) =
((pi, 0), (0, 0, 0, 0)) (corresponding to subgame perfect equilibrium (c1, d0e0) in Γ1) is
not Nash equilibrium in ΓEWL1 . The second player can gain by choosing, for example,
(θ2, β2, θ3, β3) = (pi, pi/2, pi, 0) instead of (0, 0, 0, 0). Then she obtains the fair devision
payoff. Moreover, for any other strategy of the first player (θ1, β1), player 2 can select,
for instance, (0, 0, 0, 0) to obtain a payoff being a mixture of uf and uu. This proves
that the unfair division uu cannot be a result in (13). The fair division uf in turn can
be achieved through continuum of Nash equilibria. Let us denote by NE(ΓEWL1 ) the set
of all Nash equilibria of ΓEWL1 . An examination of (19) shows that:{
((pi, β1), (pi, β2, pi, β3)) : β2 + β3 ≤ pi
4
,
3∑
j=1
βj =
pi
2
}
⊂ NE(ΓEWL1 ) (23)
as well as {
((0, β1), (0, β2, pi, 0)) : β1, β2 ∈
[
0,
pi
2
]}
⊂ NE(ΓEWL1 ). (24)
Moreover, all strategy profiles of these sets generate the payoff vector uf for any division
factor 1/2 < δ < 1. To prove inclusion (23) let us consider any strategy (θ′1, β
′
1) of player
1 given that player 2’s strategy from (23) is fixed. Then for β2 + β3 ≤ pi/4 we have
E1((θ
′
1, β
′
1), (pi, β2, pi, β3))
=
[
1
2
AC sin2
θ′1
2
sin2(β ′1 + β2 + β3) + δAC cos
2 θ
′
1
2
sin2(β2 + β3)
]
. (25)
Since β2+β3 ≤ pi/4, the maximum value of (25) is achieved if the second element of the
sum is 0. It implies that the best response of player 1 is θ′1 = pi and β
′
1 = pi/2− β2− β3.
The second player cannot gain by deviating as well because she always obtains no
more than AC/2 in ΓEWL1 . Therefore, each profile of set (23) indeed constitutes Nash
equilibrium. Inclusion (24) can be proved in similar way. Notice that there are also
Nash equilibria different from (23) and (24) that generate the payoff outcome AC/2 for
both players. For example, a strategy profile ((pi, pi/4), (pi, pi/4, pi/2, 0)).
Intuitively, a huge number of fair solutions in ΓEWL1 being NE together with a lack
of an equilibrium outcome uu favors the second player in comparison to the classi-
cal game Γ1 . However, it does not assure the second player the fair payoff AC/2
yet. Since the players choose their strategies simultaneously, they cannot coordinate
them. If the first player unilaterally deviates from a strategy dictated by (24) and
she plays a strategy being a part of (23) then both players receive nothing as we have
E1,2((pi, β1), (0, β2, pi, 0)) = 0 for all β1, β2 ∈ [0, pi/2]. On the other hand, it turns out
that the statement that each of these equilibria is equally likely to occur is not true.
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Let us investigate which equilibria in Γ1 are preserved in Γ
EWL
1 bearing in mind that
the unitary strategies U(θ, 0) are quantum counterparts to classical moves in Γ1. As we
have seen there is no equilibrium profile in ΓEWL1 that allows the first player to gain δAC.
Therefore, in particular, the unfair division equilibrium (c1, d0e0) of Γ1 cannot be gener-
ated by any unitary operations U(θ, 0). However, each fair division equilibrium (pure or
mixed) of (2) can be reconstructed in (13). The profile ((0, 0), (0, 0, pi, 0)) corresponding
to the equilibrium (c0, d0e1) in Γ1 is Nash equilibrium of Γ
EWL
1 since it is element of the
set (24). Next, the mixed equilibria mentioned in Section 3 can be implemented in ΓEWL1
as follows: they are the profiles where the first player chooses U(0, 0) and the second
player chooses either U(0, 0)⊗U(0, 0) with probability p ∈ [0, 1/2δ] and U(0, 0)⊗U(pi, 0)
with probability 1 − p, or in a language of behavioral strategies she just takes an op-
erator from
{
U(0, 0)⊗ U(θ, 0) : θ ∈ [2 arccos(1/√2δ), pi/2]}. According to the concept
of Schelling Point [12] players tend to select a solution that is the most natural as well
as the most distinctive among all possible choices. Therefore, if we assume that the
players prefer the fair division, they choose a profile that is an equilibrium of both Γ1
and ΓEWL1 among all equal equilibria of Γ
EWL
1 . Since all these shared equilibria generate
the same outcome, the pure equilibrium is the most natural and it ought to be chosen
as the Schelling Point.
6 Extensive form of the quantum ultimatum game
In subsection 5.1 we made observation that an extensive game and its quantum realiza-
tion differ not only in utilities but also in game trees. Now, we are going to give the
answer to the question how would a game tree of such quantum realization look like?
Let us reconsider an extensive game form given by the game tree on Figure 1a, where the
components H , P and Ii are derived from Γ1, and the outcomes O00, O01, O10 and O11,
are assigned to the terminal histories (c0, d0), (c0, d1), (c1, e0) and (c1, e1), respectively,
instead of particular payoff values. Let us denote this problem as:
Γ2 = ({1, 2}, H, P, Ii, O) . (26)
Then the tuple ΓMW2 associated with Γ2 is derived from Γ
MW
1 and only the payoff func-
tionals Ei undergo appropriate modifications. Let us write Γ
MW
2 in the language of
density matrices, for convenience. That is:
ΓMW2 = (Hc, {1, 2}, ρin, ξ, {σ0, σ1}i, X) , (27)
where
• ρin is a density matrix of the initial state (7);
• the outcome operator X is a sum of X0 +X1 defined as:
X0 = O00|00〉〈00| ⊗ 1+O01|01〉〈01| ⊗ 1;
X1 = O10|1〉〈1| ⊗ 1⊗ |0〉〈0|+O11|1〉〈1| ⊗ 1⊗ |1〉〈1|.
(28)
In this case, the density matrix ρfin of the final state |ψfin〉 takes a form
ρfin = σ
1
κ1
⊗ σ2κ2 ⊗ σ3κ3ρinσ1κ1 ⊗ σ2κ2 ⊗ σ3κ3 . (29)
The outcome functionals (5) are then equivalent to the following one:
E
(
σ1κ1 ,
(
σ2κ2 , σ
3
κ3
))
= tr (Xρfin) . (30)
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In order to give a extensive form to determine the final state ρfin in Γ
MW
2 let us modify
the way (29) of calculating the final state ρfin. To begin with, player 1 acts on the first
qubit. Next, player 2 carries out a measurement on that qubit in the computational
basis to find out what is a current state of the game. Then she performs an operation
on either the second or the third qubit of the post-measurement state depending on
whether the measurement outcome 0 or 1 has occurred. The operation of the second
player ultimately defines the final state that is inserted to the formula (30). The proce-
dure can be formalized as follows:
Sequential procedure
1. σ1κ1ρinσ
1
κ1
= ρκ1 the player 1 performs an operation σ
1
κ1
on her qubit of
the initial state ρin
2.
Mιρκ1Mι
tr(Mιρκ1)
= ρκ1,ι,
pκ1,ι = tr(Mιρκ1,ι)
the player 2 prepares the measurement {M0,M1} de-
fined by Mι = |ι〉〈ι|⊗ I ⊗ I, ι = 0, 1 on the first qubit of
the state σκ1ρinσκ1 (the probability of obtaining result
ι is denoted by pκ1,ι)
3.
∑
ι pκ1,ισ
2+ι
κ2+ι
ρκ1,ισ
2+ι
κ2+ι
= ρ′fin if a measurement outcome ι occurs, the player 2 per-
forms an operaton σκι+2 on ι + 2 qubit of the post-
measurement state
It turns out that for any strategy profile
(
σ1κ1 ,
(
σ2κ2 , σ
3
κ3
))
the final state ρfin defined both
by the formula (29) and by the sequential procedure determine the same outcome of the
game ΓMW2 .
Proof. Let density operator ρin of a state (7) be given. Then the state ρ
′
fin after the
third step of procedure can be expressed as:
ρ′fin = σ
2
κ2
M0ρκ1M0σ
2
κ2
+ σ3κ3M1ρκ1M1σ
3
κ3
=M0σ
2
κ2
ρκ1σ
2
κ2
M0 +M1σ
3
κ3
ρκ1σ
3
κ3
M1. (31)
Since XκMι = δκιX
κ, where δκι is the Kronecker’s delta, we obtain:
tr(Xρ′fin) = tr(X
0σ2κ2ρκ1σ
2
κ2
+X1σ3κ3ρκ1σ
3
κ3
). (32)
Notice that operation σ1 on the second (third) qubit of any state (7) does not influence
the measurement of outcomes O10 and O11 (O00 and O01), because of the form of X
1
(X0), which means that:
tr(X ισ2+ικ2+ιρκ1σ
2+ι
κ2+ι
) = tr(X ισ2κ2 ⊗ σ3κ3ρκ1σ2κ2 ⊗ σ3κ3) for ι = 0, 1. (33)
Inserting (33) into the formula (32) we get:
tr (Xρ′fin) = tr
((
X0 +X1
)( 3⊗
j=1
σjκjρin
3⊗
j=1
σjκj
))
. (34)
The right-hand side of (34) is equal the expected outcome given by formula (30). Thus,
the two ways of determining the final state are outcome-equivalent. 
We claim that performing quantum measurement is a more natural manner to play
quantum games than observation of player’s actions taken previously - the way suggested
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Figure 3: The extensive game associated with the quantum realization ΓMW2 .
by games played classically. Since the result of a quantum game is determined by the
measurement outcome of the final state instead of actions taken by players, each stage of
the quantum game also ought to be set via a quantum measurement of a current state.
Moreover, when we suppose the second player’s move dependence on actions of the first
player in Γ2 then it implies the same game tree as in Figure. 1a). This way, however,
stands in contradiction to the results in subsection 5.1 that tell us that the game trees
must be different. Of course, if the initial state is |000〉〈000| (i.e., when game given by
(27) boils down to a game (26)), observation of the course of the game played classically
and with the use of quantum measurement coincide.
Let us study what a game tree corresponding to the game ΓMW2 is yielded by the
above-mentioned procedure. According to the first step, the initial history ∅ is followed
by two actions of the first player. Next, the measurement on the first qubit is made.
The two possible measurement outcomes ι = 0, 1 can be identified with two actions
(following each player 1’s move) of a chance mover that are taken with probability pκ1,ι.
Finally the player 2 acts on ι + 2 qubit of the state ρι after each history associated
with the outcome ι. Therefore, all histories followed by given outcome ι constitutes an
information set of player 2. Such description in a form of a game tree is illustrated in
Figure 3. The outcomes O′0.κ1,κ2 and O
′
1.κ1,κ3
are determined by the following equations:
O′0.κ1,κ2 = tr(Xσκ2ρκ1,0σκ2), O
′
1.κ1,κ3
= tr(Xσκ3ρκ1,1σκ3). (35)
We have proved that the two approaches: (29) and the sequential one to calculate
the final state are outcome-equivalent. Therefore, it should be expected that extensive
forms of Γ2 and Γ
MW
2 coincide when the initial state is a basis state. In fact, given
ρin = |000〉〈000| the probabilities pκ1,ι are expressed by the formula pκ1,ι = δκ1,ι, where
κ1, ι ∈ {0, 1}. Then, the available outcomes given by Eq. (35) are as follows: O′0.00 = O00,
O′0.01 = O01, O
′
1.10 = O10 and O
′
1.11 = O11. By identifying σ
1
κ1
:= cκ1, σ
2
κ2
:= dκ2 ,
σ3κ3 := eκ3 the extensive game in Figure 3 represents game Γ2.
13
7 Conclusion
We have shown that our proposal extends the ultimatum game in the quantum area.
Although proposed scheme is suitable only for a normal representation of the ultimatum
game in which some features of corresponding game in extensive form are lost, it passes
on valuable information about how passing to the quantum domain influences a course
of extensive games. The dominant position of player 1, when the ultimatum game
is played classically, can be weakened in the case of playing the game via both the
MW approach and the EWL approach. Another thing worth noting is that the the
quantization significantly extends the game tree compared with classical case. It makes
the normal representation to be more convenient way to analyze the game than the way
of extensive form.
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